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Tortious Tweets: A Practical Guide to Applying 
Traditional Defamation Law to Twibel1 Claims 
“A reputation once broken may possibly be repaired, but the 
world will always keep their eyes on the spot where the crack 
was.”2 
INTRODUCTION 
On March 17, 2009, Courtney Love expressed her outrage with 
the “Boudoir Queen,” Dawn Simorangkir, on Twitter3 during a 
business dispute over $4,000.4 Simorangkir filed a defamation 
action in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, claiming 
Love’s tweets5 injured her reputation and negatively affected her 
clothing business.6 A week before trial, Love settled the claim for 
$430,000.7 Following the settlement, Simorangkir’s attorney 
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 1. The term twibel is used to describe libelous statements posted on 
Twitter. See “Don’t Twibel on Me”: Tweets as Libel Lawsuits, JUSTICIA.COM 
(Apr. 1, 2011), http://onward.justia.com/2011/04/01/dont-twibel-on-me-tweets-
as-libel-lawsuits/. 
 2. Mary Eule, Your Reputation—Take It Seriously, EZINEARTICLES (Oct. 17, 
2005), http://ezinearticles.com/?Your-Reputation---Take-It-Seriously &id=83895 
(quoting Joseph Hall); @AndyBeal, TWITTER (Feb. 15, 2010), https://twitter 
.com/#!/andybeal/status/9169919667 (quoting Joseph Hall). 
 3. Twitter is a “real-time information network” used to share the latest 
information about what users find interesting. See About, TWITTER, 
http://twitter.com/about (last visited Nov. 8, 2011). See also discussion infra 
Part II. 
 4. Matthew Belloni, Courtney Love to Pay $430,000 in Twitter Case, 
REUTERS, Mar. 3, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011 
/03/04/us-courtneylove-idUSTRE7230F820110304.  
 5. The tweets in question included: “austin [sic] police are morethan [sic] 
ecstatic to pick her up she has a history of dealing cocaine, lost all custody of 
her child, assault and burglary”; “stay away well well away, and etsy cant [sic] 
wait tos e [sic] the backof [sic] her, so goodbye asswipe nasty lying hosebag 
[sic] thief, now for pleasant things”; “scorched earth ignore and blacklist, few 
people ever deserve our total ignoring butthis [sic] thief and burglar does, austin 
[sic] police loathher!orange [sic];” “as one of her many bullied victims smashes 
her face soon as shes an assault addict herself ( theres [sic] apprently [sic] 
prostitution in her record too”; and “little bassists. goodbye ‘boudoir queen’ to 
be replacedby [sic] 100s of great indie designers on etsy that are trained that do 
know whattheyredoin [sic].” Complaint at 6–7, Simorangkir v. Love, No. 
BG410593 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2009), available at http://www.citmedialaw.org 
/sites/citmedialaw.org/files/2009-03-26-Simorangkir%20Complaint_0.pdf.  
 6. Id. 
 7. Shea Bennett, The Price of Defame—Courtney Love’s Twitter Rant 
Costs Her $430,000, MEDIABISTRO (Mar. 4, 2011, 11:34 AM), http:// 
www.mediabistro.com/alltwitter/courtney-love-defame-lawsuit_b6126.  
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opined, “One would hope that, given this disaster, restraint of pen, 
tongue, and tweet would guide Ms. Love’s future conduct.”8 It 
didn’t. 
While the Love v. Simorangkir litigation was pending, Love 
approached Rhonda Holmes at the Gordon & Holmes Law Firm in 
an effort to reenlist9 Holmes as her attorney in a property dispute 
involving Love’s late husband, Kurt Cobain.10 Holmes informed 
Love that Love’s substance abuse problem would preclude Holmes 
from serving as her attorney.11 In response, Love tweeted, “I was f-
--ing devastated when Rhonda J Holmes Esq [sic] of San Diego 
was bought off . . . .”12 Holmes and the law office filed a 
defamation suit alleging that Love’s tweets caused “irreparable 
damage to plaintiffs’ business, name[,] and reputation.”13 Love’s 
motion to dismiss was denied, leaving open the possibility that a 
jury will decide whether the tweet could be construed as stating 
actual facts14 about Ms. Holmes.15  
Defamation actions arising from statements posted to Twitter 
are not limited to celebrities.16 In July 2009, the Horizon 
                                                                                                             
 8. Jason Beahm, Courtney Love Twitter Defamation Case Settled: Love 
Pays $430,000, FINDLAW (Mar. 7, 2011, 5:48 AM) http://blogs. Findlaw 
.com/celebrity_justice/2011/03/courtney-love-twitter-defamation-case-settled-
love-pays-430000.html.  
 9. Gordon & Holmes previously represented Love in the Cobain property 
dispute on the condition that Love refrain from drug use during the attorney–
client relationship. Id. Love fired the firm and retained another attorney. Robert 
Kahn, Lawyers Claim Courtney Love Defamed Them, COURTHOUSE NEWS 
SERV. (May 27, 2011), http://www.courthousenews.com/2011/05/27/36895 
.htm. Later that year, Love became dissatisfied with her attorney and solicited 
the assistance of Gordon & Holmes again. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Eriq Gardner, Courtney Love Twitter Defamation Case Moves Forward, 
THE HOLLYWOOD REP., Sept. 23, 2011, http://www.hollywoodreporter .com/thr-
esq/courtney-love-twitter-defamation-case-239702. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Complaint at 4, Gordon & Holmes v. Love, No. BC-462438, 2011 WL 
2062323 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 26, 2011). 
 14. The First Amendment protects speech that cannot “reasonably [be] 
interpreted as stating actual facts about” an individual. Milkovich v. Lorain 
Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 17 (1990) (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 
485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988)). Accordingly, Holmes will only recover if a reasonable 
reader would infer that Love’s tweet conveys “actual facts” about her. 
 15. Gardner, supra note 11.  
 16. In another defamation suit, singer Johnny Gill was sued by Ira DeWitt 
for tweeting that she hired another vocalist to finish his song and leaked an 
unofficial version. Lauren Dugan, Twitter Defamation Cases Are Heating Up, 
MEDIABISTRO (Aug. 17, 2011, 3:15 PM), http://www.mediabistro.com/alltwitter 
/twitter-defamation-cases-are-heating-up_b12799. See also Julie Hilden, Libel 
by Twitter? The Suit Against Kim Kardashian over the “Cookie Diet”, 
FINDLAW (Jan. 4, 2010), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hilden/20100104.html 
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Management Group filed a libel action against Amanda Bonnen 
for tweeting, “Who said sleeping in a moldy apartment was bad for 
you? Horizon realty thinks it’s okay.”17 Fortunately for Bonnen, 
who could not afford defense counsel, several attorneys took the 
case pro bono and successfully moved for dismissal on the grounds 
that “the tweet was not defamatory as a matter of law because the 
tweet was indefinite, contained no verifiable facts, was not 
sufficiently connected to Horizon and when considered in the 
context of Bonnen’s other tweets, should be subject to innocent 
construction.”18  
More recently, Dr. Jerry Darm sued blogger Tiffany Craig in 
Oregon for $1,000,000 claiming that she damaged his reputation by 
tweeting about prior disciplinary action taken against the 
physician.19 After viewing one of Dr. Darm’s television 
commercials, Craig performed a Google search for his name.20 She 
then revealed her findings on Twitter, stating: “[A] little bit of 
research into @drdarm revealed a pretty nasty complaint filed 
against him for attempting to trade treatment for sex in 2001.”21 
Darm and Craig reached a settlement agreement on October 7, 
                                                                                                             
 
(discussing a twibel suit against Kim Kardashian for tweets refuting a third 
party’s claim that Kardashian was on a doctor’s “cookie diet”). 
 17. See Verified Complaint at 2, Horizon Group Management, LLC v. 
Bonnen, No. 2009-L-008675, 2009 WL 2231162 (Ill. Cir. Ct. July 20, 2009). 
 18. Twitter Defamation Case Dismissed, LESLIEREIS.COM (Jan. 23, 2010), 
http://www.lesliereis.com/pb/wpb375b750/wp_b375b750.html. Bonnen’s attorney 
argued that the tweets, when considered together, could not be interpreted as stating 
actual facts about Horizon. 2-615 Motion to Dismiss, Horizon Grp. Mgmt., LLC v. 
Bonnen, No. 2009-L-008675 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 10, 2009), available at http:// 
www.citmedialaw.org/sites/citmedialaw.org/files/2009-11-10-Bonnen%20Motion 
%20to%20Dismiss.pdf. However, the court’s dismissal order did not give reasons 
for the dismissal. See Order, Horizon Grp. Mgmt., LLC v. Bonnen, No. 2009-L-
008675 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Jan. 20, 2010), available at http://www.citmedialaw. 
org/sites/citmedialaw.org/files/2010-01-20-Horizon%20v.%20Bonnen%20Dismis 
sal%20Order.pdf.  
 19. Complaint, Darm v. Craig, No. 110708823, 2011 WL 2947342 (Or. Cir. 
July 11, 2011). See also Kara H. Murphey, Defamation in 140 Characters or 
Less, PORTLAND TRIB., Sept. 7, 2011, http://portlandtribune.com/component 
/content/article?id=11881. 
 20. Murphey, supra note 19. 
 21. Id. 
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201122—approximately two weeks before the parties were due in 
court to continue arguing Craig’s motion to dismiss.23  
The increased popularity of social media, particularly Twitter, 
has been accompanied by a concomitant rise in defamation 
lawsuits.24 Despite arguments to the contrary,25 the proliferation of 
Twitter use and the associated surge in twibel claims do not require 
a dramatic transformation in the legal standards applied to libel 
claims. The current standards continue to provide the most 
appropriate balance between First Amendment free speech 
considerations and the important state interest in protecting 
reputation.26 This Comment seeks to assist courts confronted by 
twibel cases by demonstrating how traditional defamation 
considerations can, and should, be applied to defamatory tweets.27  
The two critical components of the traditional analysis are the 
plaintiff’s status as a public or private figure and whether the 
allegedly defamatory remark relates to a matter of public or private 
concern.28 Lower courts have set forth a number of tests to 
determine the status of a plaintiff in a defamation action.29 These 
tests, coupled with several features of Twitter, provide courts with 
ample criteria to adjudicate whether the plaintiff is a public 
official–figure or private figure and, consequently, whether the 
                                                                                                             
 22. Kara H. Murphey, Blogger, Dr. Darm Settle Landmark Twitter Lawsuit, 
PORTLAND TRIB., Oct. 11, 2011, http://portlandtribune.com/component /content 
/article?id=13802. Although the terms of the settlement remain confidential, the 
allegedly tortious tweet has not been removed from Craig’s Twitter page. Id. 
 23. Kara H. Murphey, Twitter Standoff, PORTLAND TRIB., Oct. 5, 2011, 
http://portlandtribune.com/component/content/article?id=13399. Craig moved to 
dismiss under Oregon’s anti-SLAPP law. Id. Anti-SLAPP laws are designed to 
discourage “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation.” Id. Although 
Oregon’s anti-SLAPP law was a key issue in the Dr. Darm litigation, this 
Comment does not discuss the relationship between anti-SLAPP provisions and 
twibel claims.  
 24. See supra text accompanying notes 4–23. 
 25. The arguments for revising current defamation law in light of the media 
revolution are outlined in Part III infra. 
 26. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966) (“Society has a 
pervasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon 
reputation.”). 
 27. Though this Comment focuses on defamation actions stemming from 
libelous communication on Twitter, the proposed approach might readily 
transfer to defamation claims arising from posts to other social media platforms 
such as Facebook and Google Plus. 
 28. See generally discussion infra Part I.  
 29. See infra Part I.C.2.  
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plaintiff must establish that the defendant acted with “actual 
malice”30 in publishing the defamatory communication.  
Additionally, a tweet’s relevance to a matter of public concern 
is discernable in the same manner as that of a statement published 
in a traditional medium. A statement on a matter of public concern 
published in the New York Times would retain its public nature if 
posted to Twitter.31 It is possible, however, that an issue might 
become a matter of public concern simply by being discussed on 
Twitter.32 This Comment will show that public issues arising from 
Twitter are identifiable and are easily analyzed under the 
traditional approach.  
In order to assist courts with applying the traditional 
defamation standards to twibel claims, this Comment will first 
review the Supreme Court’s defamation case law, highlighting the 
emergence of the public figure distinction and “matter of public 
concern” considerations and the policies underlying these two 
factors. Part II explores the manner in which Twitter is used and 
discusses several of the site’s unique features that will help guide 
the defamation analysis. Part III outlines the arguments for revising 
the current defamation framework and identifies the flaws in these 
positions. Part IV begins by demonstrating how the traditional 
considerations outlined in Part I could be applied to twibel claims. 
This Part also addresses the importance of a broad approach to the 
context analysis.33 Part IV argues that a straightforward approach 
                                                                                                             
 30. The Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan defined actual malice as 
knowledge of falsity or a reckless disregard for the truth of the statement. 376 
U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). 
 31. For instance, a tweet communicating the death of Libyan Colonel 
Muammar el-Qaddifi relates to important public issues in the same way that an 
article published in the New York Times on the same matter does. Compare 
@Afterseven, TWITTER (Oct. 26, 2011), http://twitter.com/Afterseven/status 
/129350664819183616 (“Qaddafi Reportedly Died of Wounds Sustained Before 
Capture is.gd/Yy4jBz because of course Muslims dont commit war crimes 
.#tcot”), with Kareem Fahim et al., Violent End to an Era As Qaddafi Dies in 
Libya, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/world 
/africa/qaddafi-is-killed-as-libyan-forces-take-surt.html?r=1&scp=1&sq=gaddafi 
%20is%20dead&st=cse (reporting the death of Qadaffi). 
 32. A user’s homepage on Twitter notes “trending topics”—that is, “the 
hottest emerging topics of discussion on Twitter that matter most” to the user. 
FAQs About Twitter’s Trends, TWITTER, http://support.twitter.com/groups/31-
twitter-basics/topics/111-features/articles/101125-faqs-about-twitter-s-trends (last 
visited Jan. 2, 2013). 
 33. Context is a critical factor in at least two specific areas of defamation 
law. First, “[w]hether . . . speech addresses a matter of public concern must be 
determined by [the expression’s] content, form, and context . . . as revealed by 
the whole record.” Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 
749, 761 (1985) (emphasis added) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 
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to these issues is the most effective method of extending traditional 
considerations to twibel claims.  
I. @SUPREMECOURT #SETTINGTHESTANDARD34 
A. Defining #Defamation 
Generally, a statement is defamatory if it “tends so to harm the 
reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the 
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing 
with him.”35 Defamation can take the form of libel (printed 
defamation) or slander (spoken defamation).36 Although specific 
defamation law varies from state to state,37 the plaintiff in a 
defamation action generally must establish four criteria to recoup 
damages: (1) the defendant published a false and defamatory 
statement about the plaintiff;38 (2) the defendant made an 
                                                                                                             
 
147–48 (1983)). Second, context analysis may aid the fact-finder in 
distinguishing actionable statements of “actual facts” from protected “subjective 
speculation” or “rhetorical hyperbole.” See Biospherics, Inc. v. Forbes, Inc., 151 
F.3d 180, 186 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that in light of the “tenor, language, and 
context” of the article, the challenged statements were not defamatory because a 
reasonable reader would not view them as stating actual facts about the 
plaintiff); Lyrissa Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in 
Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 939 (2000) (suggesting that statements should be 
considered in light of their immediate and broader social context to discern 
whether the communication should be interpreted as stating actual facts, 
“subjective speculation,” or “rhetorical hyperbole”); see also infra Part IV.C. 
 34. The use of the “@” and “#” symbols on Twitter is explained in depth in 
Part II infra. 
 35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977). See also PROSSER & 
KEETON ON TORTS § 111, at 773 (5th ed. 1984) (“Defamation is that which tends 
to injure ‘reputation’ in the popular sense; to diminish the esteem, respect, good 
will or confidence in which the plaintiff is held, or to excite adverse, derogatory 
or unpleasant feelings or opinions against him.”). 
 36. 1 ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION § 2.3, at 2-8 (3d ed. 2001). 
 37. Compare Kimmerle v. New York Evening Journal, Inc., 186 N.E. 217, 
218 (N.Y. 1933) (citing Sydney v. MacFadden Newspaper Publ’g Corp., 151 
N.E. 209, 210 (N.Y. 1926) (“[W]ords which tend to expose one to public hatred, 
shame, obloquy, contumely, odium, contempt, ridicule, aversion, ostracism, 
degradation or disgrace, or to induce an evil opinion of one in the minds of 
right-thinking persons, and to deprive one of their confidence and friendly 
intercourse in society.”), with Madison v. Yunker, 589 P.2d 126, 129 (Mont. 
1978) (“Libel is a false and unprivileged publication by writing, printing . . . 
which exposes any persons to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which 
causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in 
his occupation.”). 
 38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977). 
2013] COMMENT 565 
 
 
 
unprivileged communication to a third party;39 (3) the defendant is 
guilty of a level of fault arising at least to the level of negligence;40 
and (4) the communication is actionable per se41 or causes special 
harm.42 These criteria alone were sufficient to establish a claim for 
defamation until the Court’s decision in New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan.43 For the first time, the New York Times Court considered 
the First Amendment implications of the common law tort of 
defamation.  
B. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan: @PublicOfficals 
#ActualMaliceRequired  
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,44 L.B Sullivan, the 
Commissioner of Public Affairs in Montgomery, Alabama, 
brought a defamation claim against four individuals and the New 
York Times newspaper.45 Sullivan alleged that an advertisement 
implicitly accused him of countering Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s 
civil rights movement with “intimidation and violence.”46 Under 
instructions that the statements in the advertisement were libelous 
per se, the jury found for the plaintiff and awarded $500,000 in 
damages.47 According to then-existing Alabama law, a statement 
was libelous per se if it “tend[ed] to injure a person . . . in his 
reputation” or “bring him into public contempt.”48 At the time, the 
only defense to libel per se was truth in “all [the expression’s] 
particulars.”49  
The United States Supreme Court held that requiring a 
commentator to prove that his criticism of official conduct is 
                                                                                                             
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) 
(“[S]o long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define 
for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster 
of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.”). 
 41. Statements that are “actionable per se” render the publisher liable for 
defamation even though the statement does not cause special harm, unless the 
statement is true or the defendant was privileged to publish it. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 569 (1977). 
 42. Id. § 558.  
 43. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 256. 
 46. Id. at 258.  
 47. Id. at 256, 262. 
 48. Id. at 267. 
 49. Id.  
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factually true would inevitably lead to self-censorship.50 To 
preserve the constitutional guarantees of free speech and freedom 
of the press, the Court held that a “public official” may not recover 
damages for defamatory statements addressing his official conduct 
unless the official can establish that the statement was made with 
“actual malice.”51 The Court went on to define “actual malice” as 
“knowledge that [the statement] was false or [made] with reckless 
disregard of whether it was false or not.”52 New York Times 
marked the first in a string of decisions that analyzed the First 
Amendment’s impact on the common law tort of defamation.  
In Rosenblatt v. Baer,53 the Court explained that the “public 
official” distinction in New York Times applied to governmental 
employees “who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial 
responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental 
affairs.”54 Defamation law protects society’s interest in preserving 
reputation, yet this interest conflicts with the constitutional 
guarantees of free speech and free press in cases where the interest 
in public discourse is particularly strong.55 In an effort to resolve 
the tension between the conflicting interests, the Court held: 
Where a position in government has such apparent 
importance that the public has an independent interest in 
the qualifications and performance of the person who holds 
it, beyond the general public interest in the qualifications 
and performance of all government employees, both 
elements [the Court] identified in New York Times are 
present and the New York Times malice standards apply.56  
To ensure that free speech on public issues remains wide open, 
the Court has expanded the application of the New York Times 
“actual malice” standard to include a broader category of 
defamation plaintiffs. 
                                                                                                             
 50. Id. at 279. The Court explained: 
Under such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be 
deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be 
true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can 
be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so. They tend 
to make only statements which “steer far wider of the unlawful zone.” 
Id. (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)). 
 51. Id. at 279–80. 
 52. Id. 
 53. 383 U.S. 75 (1966). 
 54. Id. at 85. 
 55. Id. at 86. 
 56. Id. 
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C. Extending #ActualMalice to @PublicFigures  
1. Distinguishing @PublicFigures from @PrivateFigures  
a. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts & Associated Press v. Walker: 
Effective #CounterSpeech 
The “actual malice” standard was first extended to include 
persons that voluntarily involved themselves with the resolution of 
public issues. In 1967, the Court decided two companion cases—
Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts57 and Associated Press v. 
Walker58—addressing the applicability of the “actual malice” 
standard to “persons who are not public officials, but who are 
‘public figures’ and [are] involved in issues in which the public has 
a justified and important interest.”59  
The petitioner in Curtis Publishing published an article 
accusing Respondent Butts, the athletic director at the University 
of Georgia, of plotting to “fix” a football game between the 
University of Georgia (“UGA”) and the University of Alabama.60 
Prior to serving as the athletic director, Butts served as the head 
football coach at UGA and was well-known in the college football 
community.61  
Walker filed the libel claim at issue in Associated Press v. 
Walker after the Associated Press released a news dispatch 
reporting that Walker led a violent crowd against federal marshals 
during a “massive riot” at the University of Mississippi.62 The 
crowd was protesting federal efforts to compel the enrollment of an 
African American student at the university.63 Walker admitted to 
speaking with a group of students during the rally but claimed that 
he advocated “restraint and peaceful protest” rather than 
violence.64  
A majority of the Court agreed that the First Amendment limits 
state libel law as it relates to public officials and public figures yet 
disagreed about the appropriate standard that public figures must 
                                                                                                             
 57. 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (plurality opinion). 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. at 134. 
 60. Id. at 135–36. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 140. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 141. Walker was involved in the issue of physical federal 
intervention and openly advocated against such action. Id. at 140. The Court 
noted that he “could fairly be deemed a man of some political prominence” due 
to his involvement in the issue. Id. 
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prove to prevail on a defamation claim.65 Chief Justice Warren’s 
concurrence, joined by four other justices,66 concluded that the 
New York Times standard extended to public figures allegedly 
defamed in relation to their role in matters of public concern.67 
Therefore, both public officials and public figures must prove that 
the defendant acted with “actual malice” to recover for defamatory 
statements related to their role in public issues. 
The Court found that both Butts and Walker were public 
figures.68 Butts’s status as athletic director at UGA was likely 
sufficient to make him a public figure, the Court explained, and 
Walker’s “purposeful activity” amounted to a “thrusting of his 
personality into the ‘vortex’ of an important public controversy.”69 
Public figures are distinguishable from private figures because a 
public figure has “commanded sufficient continuing public interest 
and [has] sufficient access to the means of counterargument to be 
able ‘to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies’ of 
the defamatory statements.”70  
Although Curtis Publishing and Walker clarified that the New 
York Times “actual malice” standard applies to both public 
officials and public figures, the Court gave no indication on the 
stance it would take with regard to private figures bringing a libel 
action.71 
                                                                                                             
 65. Id. at 162 (Warren, C.J., concurring). A four-justice plurality stated that 
“a ‘public figure’ who is not a public official may . . . recover damages for a 
defamatory falsehood whose substance makes substantial danger to reputation 
apparent, on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme 
departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to 
by responsible publishers.” Id. at 155 (plurality opinion). This standard did not 
carry the day, however, because four justices joined Chief Justice Warren’s 
concurrence. See infra text accompanying note 66. 
 66. Justice Black and Justice Douglas joined Chief Justice Warren’s opinion 
in Curtis Publishing to form a majority on the question of the appropriate 
standard for defamation of public figures, despite their view that publishers 
should have an absolute immunity from liability for defamation. See Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 336 n.7 (1974). 
 67. Curtis Publ’g, 388 U.S. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring).  
 68. Id. at 154–55 (plurality opinion). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927)).  
 71. The Curtis Publishing plurality was unprepared to establish a standard 
for private plaintiffs. See id. at 155 n.19 (“Nor does anything we have said 
touch, in any way, libel or other tort actions not involving public figures or 
matters of public interest.”). 
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b. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.: Extending #ActualMalice 
to @PrivateFigures  
The petitioner in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,72 a 
distributor of nudist magazines, was arrested for violating 
Philadelphia’s obscenity laws.73 Following Rosenbloom’s arrest, 
Respondent—a local radio station and newspaper—published 
reports that he was arrested for distributing “obscene literature” 
and was a “smut merchant.”74 Petitioner Rosenbloom filed a libel 
action against the radio station, claiming that Respondent’s 
characterization of the material as “obscene” constituted libel per 
se.75 For the first time since New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the 
Court granted certiorari to a case involving a defamation action 
filed by a private plaintiff on a matter of public concern.76  
A plurality of the Court held that the First Amendment policy 
supporting the New York Times standard was equally as 
fundamental in the case of private figures.77 To guard against self-
censorship,78 the plurality extended the “actual malice” standard to 
cases involving statements about a private-figure plaintiff’s 
involvement in a public issue.79  
c. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.: Abandoning #Rosenbloom 
Only three years later, the Court abandoned the Rosenbloom 
plurality’s approach in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.80 The Court 
confirmed the holdings in New York Times and Curtis Publishing, 
noting that the “actual malice” standard functions as an 
                                                                                                             
 72. 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (plurality opinion), abrogated by Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).  
 73. Id. at 32. 
 74. Id. at 33. 
 75. Id. at 36 (emphasis added). Respondent’s publications bluntly described 
the literature as “obscene.” Id. The trial court later determined that the 
publications were not obscene as a matter of law. Id.  
 76. See supra text accompanying note 71. Until this point, the Court had 
only reviewed defamation cases involving public officials and public figures.  
 77. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 52. The New York Times standard was 
“applied to libel of a public official or public figure to give effect to the 
Amendment’s function to encourage ventilation of public issues, not because the 
public official has any less interest in protecting his reputation than an individual 
in private life.” Id. at 46.  
 78. The Court noted that a distinction between public and private figures 
“could easily produce the paradoxical result of dampening discussion of issues 
of public or general concern because they happen to involve private citizens.” 
Id. at 48. 
 79. Id. at 52. 
 80. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
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“accommodation between [the interest of the press and broadcast 
media in immunity from liability] and the limited state interest in 
the context of libel actions brought by public persons.”81 The Court 
discarded the Rosenbloom approach,82 however, for two reasons.  
First, the primary method of recourse for any victim of 
defamation is “self help—using available opportunities to 
contradict the lie or correct the error and thereby minimize its 
adverse impact on reputation.”83 Public officials and public figures 
have a greater access to the media, the Court reasoned, and 
therefore have a “more realistic” opportunity to counteract false 
statements than private figures.84  
Second, the Court recognized a “compelling normative 
consideration” supporting a distinction between public and private 
figures: Public officials and public figures “must accept the certain 
consequences of [their] involvement in public affairs” and “run[] 
the risk of closer public scrutiny than might otherwise be the 
case.”85 The public has an interest in matters that involve a “public 
official’s fitness for office.”86  
Although these characteristics may not fairly describe every 
public official or public figure, the media is “entitled to act on the 
assumption that public officials and public figures have voluntarily 
exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory 
falsehood concerning them.”87 These two considerations 
distinguish public figures and officials from private figures 
because the public interest simply does not extend to the conduct 
of private figures.88  
                                                                                                             
 81. Id. at 343. 
 82. See supra Part I.C.1.b (discussing the Court’s extension of the “actual 
malice” standard to private figures bringing a defamation action).  
 83. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 344–45 (citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964)). 
 87. Id. at 345. 
 88. Id. Notably, the justifications accepted in Gertz for distinguishing 
between public and private figures were explicitly rejected by the plurality in 
Rosenbloom. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), 
abrogated by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The 
Rosenbloom plurality rejected the “access to media” rationale, stating: “[T]he 
unproved, and highly improbable, generalization that an as yet undefined class 
of ‘public figures’ will be better able to respond through the media than private 
individuals also involved in such matters seems too insubstantial a reed on 
which to rest a constitutional distinction.” Id. at 46–47. The plurality also noted 
that a figure’s voluntary emergence into the public eye is immaterial to First 
Amendment values: “‘Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a 
concomitant of life in a civilized community.’” Id. (quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 
385 U.S. 374 (1967)). “Voluntarily or not, we are all ‘public’ men to some 
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Because the rationale supporting the heightened burden on 
public officials and public figures does not extend to private 
figures, the Court rejected the Rosenbloom approach and held that 
states may define the appropriate standard of liability for a 
publisher of defamatory falsehoods relating to private individuals 
but may not impose strict liability for defamatory falsehoods.89 
Although the Court’s decision in Gertz explains the 
distinguishing characteristics of public figures and officials, the 
Court provided little guidance to help lower courts determine 
whether a defamation plaintiff is a public or private figure. 
2. @LowerCourts Try to Define @PublicFigures 
The Rosenblatt Court established a fairly workable standard for 
defining a public official in a defamation action. A public official 
is a governmental employee whose position is one that “would 
invite public scrutiny and discussion of the person holding it, 
entirely apart from the scrutiny and discussion occasioned by the 
particular charges in controversy.”90  
The law is less clear, however, in distinguishing between 
public figures and private figures. In Gertz, the Supreme Court 
discussed two reasons for distinguishing between public figures 
and private figures: the public figure has a greater access to the 
media and he has voluntarily placed himself in the public eye.91 
Although these characteristics explain the Court’s motivation for 
creating the distinction between public and private figures, they do 
not establish a test for lower courts to use in making the 
distinction.92 Accordingly, lower courts have crafted a test to 
distinguish public figures from private figures in defamation 
actions.93  
                                                                                                             
 
degree. Conversely, some aspects of the lives of even the most public men fall 
outside the area of matters of public or general concern.” Id. at 48. 
 89. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347. To recover punitive damages, however, a 
private-figure plaintiff must establish “actual malice.” Id. at 349. 
 90. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86–87 n.13 (1966). 
 91. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. See also supra Part I.C.1.c. 
 92. SACK, supra note 36, § 5.3.1, at 5-18. 
 93. Id. Whether an individual is a public figure for defamation purposes is a 
question of law for the trial court to judge. Rebozo v. Wash. Post Co., 637 F.2d 
375, 379 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976)). 
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a. “All-Purpose” @PublicFigures Require #CelebrityStatus 
There are at least two categories of public figures in 
defamation law: “all-purpose” public figures and “limited-
purpose” public figures.94 A person becomes an “all-purpose” 
public figure by thrusting “[himself] to the forefront of a particular 
public [controversy] in order to influence the resolution of the 
issues involved.”95 These individuals “occupy positions of such 
persuasive96 power and influence that they are deemed public 
figures for all purposes.”97 In Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, 
Inc., the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that an 
“all-purpose” public figure is a “well-known ‘celebrity,’ his name 
a ‘household word.’”98 The D.C. Circuit noted, “The public 
recognizes him and follows his words and deeds, either because it 
regards his ideas, conduct, or judgment as worthy of its attention or 
because he actively pursues that consideration.”99 The Waldbaum 
Court cautioned that a person might achieve “general” fame 
without being known by the public at large.100 The critical inquiry 
is whether the individual is known “to a large percentage of the 
well-informed citizenry.”101 The court in Waldbaum enumerated 
several factors to help a court decide whether an individual is an 
“all-purpose” public figure: 
The judge can examine statistical surveys, if presented, that 
concern the plaintiff’s name recognition. Previous coverage 
of the plaintiff in the press also is relevant. The judge can 
check whether others in fact alter or reevaluate their 
conduct or ideas in light of the plaintiff’s actions. He also 
can see if the plaintiff has shunned the attention that the 
public has given him and determine if those efforts have 
been successful . . . . No one parameter is dispositive; the 
decision still involves an element of judgment. 
Nevertheless, the weighing of these and other relevant 
factors can lead to more accurate and a more predictable 
                                                                                                             
 94. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. The Gertz Court also mentioned a possible 
third category of public figure—the “involuntary” public figure—but noted that 
this type of public figure is likely to be “exceedingly rare.” Id. 
 95. Id.  
 96. Did the Court mean “pervasive” power? SACK, supra note 36, § 5.3.2, at 
5-18 n.132 (citing Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 
COLUM. L. REV. 1205, 1216 n.56 (1976)). 
 97. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. 
 98. 627 F.2d 1287, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. at 1295 n.20. 
 101. Id. 
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assessment of a person’s overall fame and notoriety in the 
community.102  
Lower courts have generally interpreted the “all-purpose” 
public figure test to establish a difficult burden on a defamation 
defendant.103 As one judge noted, “[This test] sets up what 
amounts to a fairly strong presumption against a finding of 
widespread notoriety.”104 Accordingly, few people are truly “all-
purpose” public figures.105 
b. “Limited-Purpose” @PublicFigures & #VoluntaryThrust  
The more common category of public figures “thrust 
themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in 
order to influence the resolution of the issues involved.”106 These 
“limited-purpose” public figures must prove “actual malice” only 
when the defamatory communication relates to their participation 
in the particular controversy with which they have voluntarily 
associated themselves.107  
                                                                                                             
 102. Id. at 1295. See also Wilson v. Daily Gazette Co., 588 S.E.2d 197, 204–
05 (W. Va. 2003) (citing Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1295). 
 103. A defamation defendant must establish “clear evidence of general fame or 
notoriety in the community” for the plaintiff to be subjected to the New York 
Times “actual malice” standard as an “all-purpose” public figure. In re Thompson, 
162 B.R. 748, 766 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1993). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 
1980). Jerry Falwell, Ralph Nader, and Jimmy Carter are among the few 
plaintiffs whom courts have found to be “all-purpose” public figures. Erik 
Walker, Defamation Law: Public Figures—Who Are They?, 45 BAYLOR L. REV. 
955, 960 (1993) (citing Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir.1986), rev’d on 
other grounds sub nom. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1987)). 
Times have changed since Waldbaum was decided in 1980. It is likely that the 
number of “household names” has increased over the past 30 years with the 
innovation of the Internet, yet the rise in “all-purpose” public figures does not 
affect the central theme of this Comment. A rise in the number of “all-purpose” 
public figures does not render the traditional defamation analysis unworkable. 
Rather, the traditional analysis will account for the increase and ensure that 
speech concerning public figures remains protected under the First Amendment. 
See infra Part IV.A.  
 106. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (emphasis 
added). 
 107. SACK, supra note 36, § 5.3.3, at 5-20. In Marcone v. Penthouse 
International Magazine for Men, the Third Circuit held that an attorney was a 
“limited-purpose” public figure in a libel action arising out of a magazine article 
indicating that the attorney was guilty of a drug crime for which he was only 
indicted. 754 F.2d 1072, 1087 (3d Cir. 1985). The court noted that the attorney 
represented many gang members in criminal actions but also met with members at 
the gang headquarters and took occasional weekend trips with the gangs. Id. at 
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The Waldbaum Court set forth a separate analysis for whether 
an individual is a “limited-purpose” public figure.108 First, the 
Court must determine whether a public controversy exists.109 
Second, the court should discern the plaintiff’s role in the public 
controversy.110 To become a “limited-purpose” public figure, the 
plaintiff must have played a significant role in resolving the 
controversy.111 Third, the defamatory statement must have been 
“germane to the plaintiff’s participation in the controversy.”112 
Under the Waldbaum decision, a libel plaintiff will only be 
considered a “limited-purpose” public figure when these three 
prongs are met. 
In addition to defining the defamation plaintiff’s public- or 
private-figure status, courts must examine the subject matter of the 
alleged defamation to determine the level of First Amendment 
protection afforded to the speech at issue.  
                                                                                                             
 
1086. The court concluded, “Given the public nature of the activities at issue 
here, the widespread media attention and the significant contact to the Pagans of 
a non-representational type, we hold that Marcone has crossed the threshold and 
become a limited purpose public figure.” Id. at 1086–87. Because Marcone was 
held to be a “limited-purpose” public figure, he would not have to prove “actual 
malice” in a libel action arising out of an issue that was not connected to his 
gang involvement, such as an article accusing him of adultery.  
 108. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1296–98. Other courts have developed similar 
tests for defining “limited-purpose” public figures. See, e.g., Contemporary 
Mission, Inc. v. New York Times Co., 842 F.2d 612, 617 (2d Cir. 1988) 
(requiring a defamation defendant to establish that the plaintiff has (1) drawn 
public attention to his views to influence their views on the dispute that is the 
subject matter of the defamation; (2) voluntarily thrust himself into the specific 
public controversy; (3) assumed a prominent role in the public controversy; and 
(4) maintained regular access to the media). 
 109. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1296. A public controversy differs from a 
matter of public interest in that a controversy is “a dispute that in fact has 
received public attention because its ramifications will be felt by persons who 
are not direct participants.” Id. The Waldbaum court noted that courts are not to 
question the legitimacy of the dispute. Id. at 1296–97. The only question is 
whether the public is debating a specific question.  
 110. Id. at 1297. 
 111. Id. See also Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 (noting the standard for those that 
“have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies”) 
(emphasis added). 
 112. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1298. Essentially, the third prong is only 
satisfied if the alleged defamation to injure the plaintiff’s reputation in such a 
way that relates to his or her role in the resolution of the public controversy. Id.  
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D. Protecting Speech on #PublicIssues: Policy Considerations 
The First Amendment is primarily concerned with protecting 
speech pertaining to a matter of public concern.113 Accordingly, 
defamatory speech related to an important public issue receives a 
greater level of constitutional protection than defamatory speech 
concerning a purely private matter.114  
1. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.: The 
Importance of #PublicSpeech 
In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,115 the 
Court clarified the important distinction between defamatory 
speech on a matter of public concern and defamatory speech 
relating to private issues alluded to in New York Times and its 
progeny.116 The issue before the Court was whether a private 
figure must prove “actual malice” to recover punitive damages for 
defamatory speech that did not relate to a matter of public 
concern.117  
The Court held that a private figure may recover punitive 
damages for a defamatory statement related to a purely private 
issue, “even absent a showing of ‘actual malice.’”118 Citing Gertz, 
the Court noted that the state interest in compensating private 
individuals for reputational injury is “strong and legitimate.”119 
Furthermore, the First Amendment interest in protecting 
defamatory statements about matters of private concern is less 
                                                                                                             
 113. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (“The 
general proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is secured 
by the First Amendment has long been settled by our decisions.”); Hustler 
Magazine, Inc., v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (“At the heart of the First 
Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of 
ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern.”).  
 114. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 
762 (1985). 
 115. 472 U.S. 749 (plurality opinion). 
 116. Before the Court decided Dun & Bradstreet, the Court’s discussions 
centered on whether the plaintiff was a public or private person. The subject 
matter of the speech at issue in those cases generally related to matters of public 
concern, yet the question of whether the First Amendment protected speech on 
matters of private concern was left undecided. See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 
388 U.S. 130, 155 n.19 (1967). 
 117. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 751. Contra Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (The Court broadly ruled that “[s]tates may not permit 
recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on 
a showing of [‘actual malice’].”). 
 118. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 761. 
 119. Id. at 757 (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348). 
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compelling than the interest in protecting matters of public 
concern.120  
The speech at issue in Dun & Bradstreet—false credit reports 
issued to a contractor’s creditors—were not matters of public 
concern in light of the “[expression’s] content, form, and context . . . 
as revealed by the whole record.”121 The Court reasoned that the 
speech only concerned the speaker’s individual interests and specific 
business audience.122 Thus, it was not the sort of speech deserving 
special First Amendment protection to guarantee that “debate on 
public issues [will] be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”123  
The plurality decision in Dun & Bradstreet is important for 
three reasons.124 First, it vastly narrowed the category of speech 
that is subject to Gertz’s high level of protection by permitting 
states to regulate as they see fit defamatory communication 
relating to matters of purely private concern.125 Second, the 
decision puts courts in charge of judging whether the statement in 
question in a defamation action is a matter of public interest.126 
Third, the Court provided little guidance to help lower courts 
distinguish between matters of public concern and matters of 
purely private concern.127 The public–private subject matter 
distinction was further developed in the Court’s recent decision 
involving funeral picketing.  
2. Snyder v. Phelps: #OverallThrust 
The Respondent in Snyder v. Phelps,128 Westboro Baptist 
Church, picketed Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder’s funeral with 
hateful signs in an effort to spread its message that God hates 
                                                                                                             
 120. Id. at 758–59. “[S]peech on matters of public concern . . . is at the heart 
of the First Amendment’s protection.” Id. (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. 
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 121. Id. at 761 (quoting Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983)). 
 122. Id. at 762. 
 123. Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 
(1964)). 
 124. SACK, supra note 36, § 1.2.7, at 1-23. 
 125. Id.  
 126. Id. See also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 785 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (“Without explaining what is a ‘matter of public concern,’ the 
plurality opinion proceeds to serve up a smorgasbord of reasons why the speech 
at issue here is not.”). 
 127. See SACK supra note 36, § 1.2.7, at 1-23–1-24. See also Dun & 
Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 786 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The credit reporting 
at issue here surely involves a subject matter of sufficient public concern to 
require the comprehensive protections of Gertz.”). 
 128. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
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America for tolerating homosexuality.129 Matthew Snyder’s father 
sued the church for, among other things, defamation and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.130 The validity of 
Snyder’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
hinged “on whether [the] speech [was] of public or private 
concern.”131  
The Court noted that because the majority of the signs related 
to matters of broad public concern—namely “the political and 
moral conduct of the United States and its citizens, the fate of our 
Nation, homosexuality in the military, and scandals involving the 
Catholic clergy”132—Westboro’s speech concerned topics of 
legitimate public interest. The Court glossed over the signs 
personally attacking the Snyders,133 stating: “[E]ven if a few of the 
signs . . . were viewed as containing messages related to Matthew 
Snyder or the Snyders specifically, that would not change the fact 
that the overall thrust and dominant theme of Westboro’s 
demonstration spoke to broader public issues.”134  
Additionally, the Court found that the “context” of the 
speech135 did not transform the speech into a matter of private 
concern.136 The adoption of an overall-thrust-and-dominant-theme 
approach implies that the First Amendment may protect individual 
remarks within a larger communication.137 Thus, a string of tweets 
relating to a matter of public interest might be constitutionally 
protected under the First Amendment even if a single tweet in the 
                                                                                                             
 129. Id. at 1213. 
 130. Id. at 1214. The defamation case was dismissed at the district court, but 
the jury found that Westboro’s actions amounted to the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. Id. 
 131. Id. at 1215. Cf. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 
(1988) (holding that a public figure may not recover for the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress unless he shows that the publication contains a 
false statement of fact that was made with “actual malice”). 
 132. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1217. 
 133. The Court acknowledged that several signs might be viewed as directly 
addressing the Snyder family. Id. These signs included messages such as 
“You’re Going to Hell” and “God Hates You.” Id. 
 134. Id. (emphasis added). 
 135. Snyder argued that the connection between his son’s funeral and the 
speech at issue made the speech a matter of private concern. Id. 
 136. Id.  
 137. That is, provided that the speech may be broadly construed as public 
speech and that “there [is] no pre-existing relationship or conflict between [the 
parties] that might suggest [the defendant’s] speech on public matters [is] 
intended to mask an attack on [the plaintiff] over a private matter.” Id.  
578 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 
 
 
 
collection is nothing more than a personal attack on a public (or 
private138) figure. 
II. ENTER SOCIAL MEDIA: #WELCOME @TWITTER 
Twitter is “a real-time information network that connects 
[users] to the latest stories, ideas, opinions, and news about what 
[they] find interesting.”139 Users take advantage of Twitter to 
communicate with a broad audience: Over 100 million active users 
on Twitter contribute approximately 230 million tweets per day.140 
When Twitter users, referred to as tweeters or twitterers,141 sign in 
to the website, the user initially views his or her “timeline.”142 The 
“tweets”143 from each user the tweeter “follows”144 are posted in 
chronological order on his or her timeline.145 At the top of each 
user’s timeline there is a box with the question “What’s 
Happening?”146 By typing a message into this box, tweeters may 
share whatever is on his or her mind with members that follow the 
user.147 Tweets are limited to 140 characters, including spaces.148 
By default, these messages are available to anyone with a Twitter 
                                                                                                             
 138. The Snyder Court did not analyze Mr. Snyder’s public- or private-figure 
status. See generally Snyder, 131 S. Ct. 1207. 
 139. About, supra note 3. 
 140. Leena Rao, Twitter Opens the Kimono on Web Analytics; 3 Million Sites 
Now Using Tweet Button, TECHCRUNCH.COM (Sept. 13, 2011), http://techcrunch 
.com/2011/09/13/twitter-analytics/.  
 141. The Twitter Glossary, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles 
/166337-the-twitter-glossary#t (last visited Oct. 9, 2011). 
 142. What Is a Twitter Timeline?, TWITTER, https://support.twitter 
.com/articles/164083-what-is-a-timeline (last visited Dec. 17, 2012).  
 143. Tweet is used to describe both a message posted via Twitter as well 
as the act of posting a message. See The Twitter Glossary, supra note 141 
(defining Tweet (noun) and Tweet (verb)). 
 144. When a user “follows” another user, he is subscribing to the user’s tweets. 
See FAQs About Following, TWITTER, http://support.twitter.com/groups/31-twitter-
basics/topics/108-finding-following-people/articles/14019-what-is-following (last 
visited Dec. 17, 2012).  
 145. What Is a Twitter Timeline?, supra note 142. For example, if user A 
follows user B, each tweet that user B posts will appear on user A’s timeline.  
 146. How to Post a Tweet, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles 
/15367-how-to-post-a-tweet (last visited Oct. 9, 2011).  
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. The 140-character limit does not include “@mentions,” however. See 
About Tweets (Twitter Updates), TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/ groups/31-
twitter-basics/topics/109-tweets-messages/articles/127856-about-tweets-twitter-up 
dates (last visited Nov. 6, 2011). 
2013] COMMENT 579 
 
 
 
account.149 However, tweeters have the option to “protect” their 
tweets.150 Protected tweets are different from public tweets in 
several ways. First, protected tweets are not available through the 
website’s search function.151 Users may not view another user’s 
protected tweets unless they receive permission first.152 
Additionally, tweeters may not “re-tweet,”153 or share, another 
tweeter’s protected tweets.154 
Users’ actions on Twitter are not limited to simply contributing 
to “what’s happening.” For instance, tweeters may re-tweet another 
tweeter’s tweets.155 Tweeters may also “mention” other users in 
their tweets.156 Additionally, a tweeter may reply to another 
tweeter’s tweets by hovering his cursor over the tweet to which he 
wishes to reply and clicking the “reply” icon.157 If a third user 
                                                                                                             
 149. About Public and Protected Tweets, TWITTER, https://support.twitter 
.com/articles/14016-about-public-and-protected-accounts (last visited Oct. 9, 
2011).  
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. A user may share, or re-tweet, another user’s tweet by clicking on the 
“re-tweet” link located below the tweet. See FAQs About Retweets (RT), 
TWITTER, http://support.twitter.com/groups/31-twitter-basics/topics/109-tweets-
messages/articles/77606-what-is-retweet-rt (last visited Dec. 17, 2012). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. A tweeter’s ability to re-tweet certain tweets is restricted, however, 
in that one user may not re-tweet another user’s protected tweets. See id. A 
user’s ability to re-tweet a defamatory statement may exacerbate reputational 
injury by introducing the defamatory comment to a new audience each time the 
tweet is re-tweeted. Defamatory re-tweets present two unique issues that are not 
addressed in this Comment: First, to what extent is a user liable for re-tweeting a 
defamatory comment originally published by a third party? Second, to what 
extent is the original tweeter liable for damages caused by a defamatory re-
tweet? To address these issues, it may be helpful to examine the interplay 
between section 230 of the Communications Decency Act and the common law 
doctrine of republication liability. Under the common law, the original publisher 
of a defamatory statement would be liable for damages caused by republication 
if republication could be reasonably anticipated. See SACK, supra note 36, § 
2.7.2, at 2-91–2-92. However, § 230 may protect the re-tweeter from liability 
because neither Internet service providers nor Internet users “[are] treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006). Thus, in the context of a claim for re-
tweet liability, a court must decide whether a re-tweeter is a “user” under § 230.  
 156. What Are @Replies and Mentions?, TWITTER, https://support.twitter 
.com/articles/14023-what-are-replies-and-mentions (last visited Oct. 9, 2011). A 
user mentions another user by typing the user’s handle into the tweet preceded 
by the “@” symbol. Id. 
 157. Id. 
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follows both the original tweeter and the replying tweeter, the 
reply will show up in the third party’s timeline.158  
Another important feature of Twitter is the tweeter’s ability to 
link tweets to a specific subject matter by including the “#” symbol 
followed by keywords describing the subject of the tweet.159 When 
a tweeter views a tweet with a “#” symbol, he may click the 
“hashtag”160 and view a list of all tweets in that category.161 
Protected tweets, however, are only visible to tweeters that have 
been approved by the author.162 By using hashtags to mark a 
tweet’s relevance to a particular category, the user potentially 
increases his tweet’s publicity.163  
Several commentators have argued that the traditional 
defamation analysis should be reworked to account for changing 
media landscape, including the boom in the popularity of social 
media websites like Twitter. 
III. @COURTS SHOULD IGNORE COMMENTATORS’ CRY FOR 
DEFAMATION REFORMATION 
Commentators have argued that the recent changes to the 
media require a new (or revised) approach to modern defamation 
law.164 Such calls for reform in defamation law overcomplicate the 
                                                                                                             
 158. Id.  
 159. What Are Hashtags (“#” Symbols)?, TWITTER, https://support.twitter 
.com/articles/49309-what-are-hashtags-symbols (last visited Oct. 9, 2011). For 
example, users tweeting about the Super Bowl might include #SuperBowl in the 
their tweets. The “hashtag” would become a hyperlink that, if clicked on, would 
link users to other tweets discussing the Super Bowl at that time.  
 160. Tweeters use the #, called a hashtag, to categorize tweets. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. One website keeps an up-to-date list of hashtags that are trending on 
Twitter, and it includes whether the hashtag is becoming more popular, less 
popular, or remaining constant. See Trending on Twitter, HASHTAGS.ORG, 
http://www.hashtags.org/trending-on-twitter/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2013). 
 164. See, e.g., David Lat & Zach Shemtob, Public Figurehood in the Digital 
Age, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 403 (2011) (arguing that the change in the 
media landscape has rendered the Gertz distinction between public and private 
figures obsolete); Ann E. O’Connor, Note, Access to Media All A-Twitter: 
Revisiting Gertz and the Access to Media Test in the Age of Social Networking, 63 
FED. COMM. L.J. 507 (2011) (proposing that the “access to media” consideration 
in Gertz should be revisited due to the proliferation of social media); Aaron 
Perzanowski, Comment, Relative Access to Corrective Speech: A New Test for 
Requiring Actual Malice, 94 CAL. L. REV. 833 (2006) (proposing a balancing test 
for requiring “actual malice” that accounts for “cacophony of internet speech” and 
the “increased diversity among defamation defendants and the concomitant variety 
of corrective speech opportunities”); Glenn H. Reynolds, Libel in the 
Blogosphere: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1157, 1165 
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analysis by failing to consider a practical application of traditional 
defamation law to libel claims in new-age media, as well as the 
policies the traditional analysis supports. Revising the defamation 
analysis to provide added protection to every post or tweet would 
unnecessarily provide First Amendment protection to nonpublic 
speech. Additionally, this approach would leave parties who are 
not “public figures” under traditional standards without a means of 
redress for reputational damage caused by a tortious tweet. This 
Part proceeds by briefly explaining the arguments for reforming 
defamation law and identifies their shortcomings.  
A. @PrivateFigures Lack Meaningful Audience in the Twitterverse  
David Lat and Professor Zach Shemtob argue that the Gertz 
“public/private [figure] distinction” should be abandoned due to 
changes in modern media.165 Instead, the authors urge courts to set 
Gertz aside in favor of Justice Brennan’s opinion in Rosenbloom v. 
Metromedia, Inc. for two reasons.166   
                                                                                                             
 
(2006) (arguing that libelous statements posted online should be analyzed under a 
slander analysis rather than a libel analysis); Julie Hilden, Should the Law Treat 
Defamatory Tweets the Same Way It Treats Printed Defamation?, JUSTICIA.COM 
(Oct. 3, 2011), http://verdict.justia.com/ 2011/10/03/should-the-law-treat-
defamatory-tweets-the-same-way-it-treats-printed-defamation (arguing that twibel 
claims do not fit well within traditional defamation law); Matt Belloni & Eriq 
Gardner, Courtney Love’s Tweets Lead to Unique Defamation Showdown, THE 
HOLLYWOOD REP., Jan. 4, 2011, http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/blogs/thr-
esq/courtney-love-s-tweets-lead-68193 (statement of defamation defense attorney 
Alonzo Wickers) (“The way Twitter is evolving, it seems to be more of a means to 
express opinion. I would hope courts give tweets the same latitude as they do an 
op-ed piece or a letter to the editor.”). Unlike op-ed pieces, posts on Twitter are 
not immediately recognizable as opinion. Publications contained in the “op-ed” 
section of a newspaper are self-proclaimed opinion and are not to be taken as 
factual statements. Twitter, on the other hand, contains a mixture of opinion, news, 
and meaningless commentary. See PEAR ANALYTICS, TWITTER STUDY—AUGUST 
2009 (2009), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/18548460/Pear-Analytics-
Twitter-Study-August-2009. For this reason, whether a statement made on Twitter 
is protected as a statement of pure opinion is better analyzed under the Court’s 
opinion in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990). See infra Part 
IV.C.2. 
 165. Lat & Shemtob, supra note 164, at 410.  
 166. Id. at 410. The Rosenbloom plurality held that both public and private 
figures must prove “actual malice” to recover for a defamatory statement 
relating to their roles in public issues. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 
U.S. 29 (1971) (plurality opinion), abrogated by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 
418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
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First, they argue that the nature of modern media has 
undermined the self-help rationale set forth in Gertz.167 The 
authors point out that, due to the availability of blogging and social 
media, “ordinary citizens have historically unprecedented access to 
effective communication channels.”168 Consequently, they 
contend, the average citizen has the ability to counter defamatory 
statements in a manner sufficient to override the “access to media” 
rationale for distinguishing between public and private figures.169 
Lat and Professor Shemtob’s argument merely pays lip service 
to one critical issue—posting a rebuttal on Twitter does not 
guarantee that anyone will read the reply.170 They acknowledge 
that the platform for speech on Twitter is not shared equally but 
argue that equal access to media is not required under Gertz.171 To 
say that all Twitter users do not have an equal voice on the website 
is an understatement. One source revealed that the average Twitter 
user only has 126 followers.172  
An average user would likely be hard-pressed to effectively 
rebut a defamatory statement posted by a user with a larger than 
average number of followers. Moreover, for the rebuttal to be 
“effective,” it would have to reach at least some of the audience 
that had access to the original statement.173 For example, the 
damages resulting from a defamatory tweet posted by user A with 
1,000,000 followers about user B with 10 followers are unlikely to 
be mitigated if user B simply posts a tweet rebutting user A’s 
statement. User B could “mention” user A in a tweet, hoping that 
user A will re-tweet his rebuttal. Yet, courts would be ill-advised to 
acknowledge this approach as “effective” counter-speech because 
the rebuttal’s potential effectiveness hinges on whether the 
                                                                                                             
 167. Lat & Shemtob, supra note 164, at 410. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 411.  
 170. Taken a step further, this argument completely ignores the possibility 
that an individual may not have access to the Internet or the means to afford a 
computer. Similarly, some potential defamation plaintiffs may have no desire to 
engage in social media use. 
 171. Lat & Shemtob, supra note 164, at 411. 
 172. Charles Arthur, Average Twitter User Has 126 Followers, and Only 20% of 
Users Go Via Website, THE GUARDIAN: TECH. BLOG (June 29, 2009, 10:24 AM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/blog/2009/jun/29/twitter-users-average-api-
traffic. Although this number may be slightly outdated, reliable sources as to the 
current average number of Twitter followers are not readily available. Nonetheless, 
the current average is certainly less than the number of followers that marquee 
celebrities like Lady Gaga have amassed. See @ladygaga, TWITTER, 
https://twitter.com/#!/ladygaga (last visited Jan. 31, 2012) (Lady Gaga has over 18 
million followers.).  
 173. O’Connor, supra note 164, at 524.  
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defamer decides to publish (by re-tweeting) the response.174 
Although modern technology provides some private individuals 
greater access to the media, the increased access does not grant 
most private figures an effective means to counter defamatory 
statements posted by widely read users.  
Lat and Professor Shemtob’s second proffered justification for 
discarding Gertz in favor of Rosenbloom is that modern technology 
has “blurred, if not eliminated,” the public–private figure 
distinction.175 They argue that the Gertz rationale fails to consider 
two byproducts of the media revolution: the “microcelebrity” and 
the “niche celebrity.”176 Instead of dividing fame between a few 
celebrities and millions of “nobodies,” “fame . . . is distributed along 
a spectrum.”177 “Microcelebrities”—those figures somewhere in the 
middle of the spectrum, such as reality TV stars and prominent 
bloggers—will continue to grow in number as society is broken into 
many “microcultures.”178 Justice Brennan’s statement that 
“[v]oluntarily or not, we are all ‘public’ men to some degree,”179 
they reason, “ring[s] even more true in the digital age.”180  
The rise in “microcelebrities” does not justify abandoning the 
Gertz distinction between public and private figures. The argument 
that commentary about “microcelebrities” should be protected 
unless made with “actual malice” fails to consider the important 
“normative consideration”181 implicit in the First Amendment. The 
purpose of protecting speech about public officials and public 
figures is to ensure that “public criticism” is uninhibited.182 Of 
course, if a “microcelebrity” involves himself in a public 
controversy, he may become a “limited-purpose” public figure 
under the Waldbaum analysis.183 But, barring any involvement in a 
                                                                                                             
 174. Accordingly, user B should not be considered a public figure due to his 
presence on Twitter alone. User B might be a public figure under the traditional 
analysis if he is a household name or has thrust himself to the forefront of a 
public controversy, see infra Part IV.B, but the fact that he is on Twitter does 
not justify forcing him to prove that user A acted with “actual malice.” This 
approach is akin to considering a college student a public figure in a lawsuit 
against the New York Times simply because the student might be able to publish 
a rebuttal in the campus newspaper. 
 175. Lat & Shemtob, supra note 164, at 410. 
 176. Id. at 413. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 48 (1971), abrogated by 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
 180. Lat & Shemtob, supra note 164, at 413. 
 181. Public figures must “accept certain necessary consequences of [their] 
involvement in public affairs.” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. 
 182. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278 (1964).  
 183. See supra Part I.B.2.b. 
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public controversy, there is no reason to afford speech about 
“microcelebrities” the heightened level of First Amendment 
protection outlined in New York Times and its progeny.184  
Additionally, Lat and Professor Shemtob support their 
argument that everyone is a public figure in some regard by noting 
the rise of the “niche celebrity.”185 They contend the rise of 
specialized blogs and interest groups within social networks makes 
it “startling easy” to become a celebrity within a particular area of 
interest.186 Just as with the “microcelebrity,” a “niche celebrity’s” 
renown alone is insufficient to undermine the policy consideration 
set forth in Gertz. As the Court noted in Dun & Bradstreet: 
“[S]peech solely in the individual interest of the speaker and its 
specific business audience . . . warrants no special protection when 
. . . the speech is wholly false and clearly damaging to the victim’s 
business reputation.”187 Again, if the “niche celebrity” has 
involved himself in the resolution of a public controversy, speech 
related to his involvement will be protected under the New York 
Times “actual malice” standard.188 
 Lat and Professor Shemtob offer Evan Chesler189 as an 
example of a niche celebrity.190 They argue that, although Chesler 
might not be classified as an “all-purpose” public figure or 
“limited-purpose” public figure, he is a “figure of great interest in 
[the legal community].”191 Because the “legal profession is 
wealthy, powerful, and prominent, and [Chesler] is a leading figure 
within it … [w]hy shouldn’t he have to demonstrate ‘actual malice’ 
with respect to reporting that covers his leadership of Cravath?”192 
Lat and Professor Shemtob bolster their argument that “niche 
celebrities,” like Chesler, should be held to the “actual malice” 
standard with dictum from Rosenblatt v. Baer: “The subject matter 
                                                                                                             
 184. There does not seem to be any justification for protecting a tweet 
attacking the reputation of Jersey Shore star Nicole “Snooki” Polizzi with the 
New York Times “actual malice” standard.  
 185. The term niche celebrity refers to “a figure of great interest in [a] 
particular field.” Lat & Shemtob, supra note 164, at 414. Lat and Shemtob offer 
a prominent attorney as an example of a “niche celebrity” due to his renown in 
the legal community. Id.  
 186. Id. at 413. 
 187. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762 
(1985) (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 
447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)). 
 188. See supra Part I.C.2.b. 
 189. Evan Chesler is the presiding partner at a leading law firm, Cravath, 
Swaine & Moore. Lat & Shemtob, supra note 164, at 413.  
 190. Id. at 414.  
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
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may have been only of local interest, but at least here, where 
publication was addressed primarily to the interested community, 
that fact is constitutionally irrelevant.”193 In so doing, the authors 
confuse two separate areas of defamation law: classification of the 
plaintiff and classification of the subject matter.194 The Court’s 
statement in Rosenblatt—that the subject matter was important to a 
specific community—was unrelated to the plaintiff’s classification. 
By stating that the subject matter of the speech was an important 
issue for a particular community, the Court was merely conceding 
the first issue—that is, that the allegedly defamatory speech at 
issue related to a matter of public concern. The key issue in 
Rosenblatt was whether the plaintiff was a “public official.”195  
                                                                                                             
 193. Id. (citing Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 83 (1966)). Lat and 
Professor Shemtob also cite to Justice Brennan’s dissent from the Court’s denial 
of certiorari in Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich to support their argument that 
those involved in issues that are relevant only to a small community should still 
be held to the New York Times standard in an action for defamation. Lat & 
Shemtob, supra note 164, at 414 n.50 (quoting Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich, 
474 U.S. 953, 963 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). The author’s reliance on 
Justice Brennan’s argument that the Court’s commitment to free speech “applies 
as much to debate in the local media about local issues as it does to debate in the 
national media over national issues,” and that  
[t]his Court’s obligation to preserve the precious freedoms established 
in the First Amendment is every bit as strong in the context of a local 
paper’s report of an incident at a local high school as it is in the 
context of an advertisement in one of the Nation’s largest newspapers 
supporting the struggle for racial freedom in the South  
is misplaced. Id. The public issue in Lorain Journal Co. involved a brawl at a local 
high school during a wrestling match and allegations that the wrestling coach, who 
is also a teacher at the high school, lied under oath when discussing the altercation. 
474 U.S. at 955–56 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Clearly, the local community had an 
interest in a scandal involving a local high-school teacher’s lying under oath about 
an incident involving student violence. See also discussion infra Part IV.C.2. The 
strong First Amendment values propounded by Justice Brennan do not readily 
transfer to commentary about the managing partner at a large private law firm. For 
example, there is little, if any, public interest in the size of the year-end bonus 
offered to associates at Cravath, Swaine, & Moore. David Lat & Elie Mystal, 
Breaking: Cravath Bonuses Are Out; Welcome to the 2011 Bonus Season!, 
ABOVETHELAW.COM (Nov. 28, 2011, 4:24 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2011 
/11/breaking-cravath-bonuses-are-out-welcome-to-the-2011-bonus-season/#more-
106389.  
 194. As the Court reiterated in Rosenblatt: “There is, first, a strong interest in 
debate on public issues, and, second, a strong interest in debate about those 
persons who are in a position significantly to influence the resolution of those 
issues.” Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966). 
 195. See id. at 83. Stated more concisely, that “[t]he subject matter may have 
been only of local interest . . . is constitutionally irrelevant” to the categorization 
of the plaintiff as a public official. Id.  
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The fact that an individual has become a prominent figure 
within a niche does not give rise to the strong First Amendment 
polices undergirding the Court’s decision in Gertz. Why hold a 
figure, like Evan Chesler, to the practically insurmountable burden 
of establishing “actual malice” when he has become well-known in 
a community for simply excelling at his job? Evan Chesler has not 
thrust himself to the forefront of a public controversy.196 Nor is he 
well-known to “a large percentage of the well-informed 
citizenry”197 so as to become an “all-purpose” public figure. That 
Chesler has accumulated a following within the legal 
community198 by performing his job199 does not justify holding 
him to the New York Times standard.  
Moreover, the “microcelebrity” and “niche celebrity” argument 
for overruling Gertz overlooks a large category of potential 
defamation plaintiffs: private figures that are neither 
“microcelebrities” nor “niche celebrities.” The Rosenbloom 
approach suggested by Lat and Shemtob would subject every 
defamation plaintiff to the “actual malice” standard if the 
defamation related to the plaintiff’s role in a public issue.200 
Adopting this standard would essentially leave a large category of 
defamation plaintiffs without recourse.201  
                                                                                                             
 196. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).  
 197. Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’ns, 627 F.2d 1287, 1295 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 
1980).  
 198. Chesler may be widely known within the “Big Law” community; 
however, it is not readily apparent that he is known by “a large percentage of the 
well-informed” members of the legal community. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1295 
n.20. 
 199. Lat and Professor Shemtob compare Chesler’s actions in leading 
Cravath to those of the petitioner in Gertz. This analogy does little to support the 
authors’ argument. The petitioner in Gertz was a reputable attorney who was 
hired to represent a murder victim’s family in a civil action against the murderer. 
418 U.S. at 325. A newspaper published an article falsely implying that 
petitioner had a criminal record, that he helped plan an attack on Chicago police 
during the 1968 Democratic Convention, and that he was a “leninist” and a 
“Communist-fronter.” Id. at 326. Why should successful attorneys such as Gertz 
and Chesler be held to the strict “actual malice” standard in a defamation action 
arising from patently false accusations?  
 200. See Lat & Shemtob, supra note 164, at 418; Rosenbloom v. 
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971), abrogated by Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).  
 201. See Joel D. Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349, 
1373 (1975) (noting that the constitutional privilege for defamation defendants 
in an action brought by a public official established in New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan has become a “near-immunity from defamation judgments”). 
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Commentators have also suggested that defamatory statements 
published online, including twibel, should be subjected to a stricter 
standard because the statements are more akin to slander than libel.  
B. Tortious Tweets: Libel or Slander? #Twibel 
Several scholars have mentioned the possibility of considering 
defamatory posts on blogs and Twitter as slander rather than libel.202 
Julie Hilden notes that tweets, like slander, are easily repeated to 
another person.203 Additionally, tweets are “evanescent,” that is, 
they are replaced by newer tweets on a user’s timeline.204 Finally, 
Hilden notes that Twitter users are likely to be more careless about 
their tweets in the same way that speakers might be careless about 
their words in a casual setting.205  
The rationale for distinguishing slander from libel is threefold. 
First, written publications are permanent; whereas, conversations 
are fleeting.206 Second, the written word is capable of broader 
circulation than the spoken word.207 Third, the act of reducing 
defamation to writing evidences a greater element of intent on the 
part of the publisher than orally communicating false statements of 
fact.208 
Simply put, tweets do not conform to the policies underlying 
the distinction between slander and libel. Tweets are permanent. 
Although individual tweets eventually vanish from the bottom of a 
user’s timeline, they remain accessible through the search function 
on Twitter and even through search engines like Google.209 
Additionally, tweets are certainly capable of wide circulation 
through original publication to a user’s followers and subsequent 
re-tweets from the followers.  
                                                                                                             
 202. See Reynolds, supra note 164, at 1165; Hilden, supra note 164. If twibel 
were treated as slander rather than libel, plaintiffs would only recover damages 
if they were able to prove that the defamatory tweet caused “special damages.” 
See SACK, supra note 36, § 2.3, at 2-10. 
 203. Hilden, supra note 164.  
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. SACK, supra note 36, § 2.3, at 2-10. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. The intent element derives from the idea that reducing a statement to 
writing is more of an intentional act than saying something in a conversation. A 
person is more likely to accidentally say something than to accidentally publish 
a statement in writing.  
 209. Moreover, every public tweet is catalogued in the Library of Congress. 
Matt Reymond, How Tweet It Is!: Library Acquires Entire Twitter Archive, 
LIBRARY OF CONG. (April 14, 2010), http://blogs.loc.gov/loc/2010/04/how-
tweet-it-is-library-acquires-entire-twitter-archive/.  
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The difference in intent with regard to tweets and conversation 
is less clear. Twitter users might post a tweet without fully thinking 
through the consequences in the same way that a person may 
reveal an idea in a conversation with a friend without much 
thought.210 Indeed, some tweets may be attributed to an accidental 
slip of the tongue. The possibility that a defamatory tweet is posted 
with a lower level of intent than a statement published in a more 
traditional form does not, however, override the fact that tweets are 
more permanent than the spoken word and are capable of wide 
circulation.  
The aforementioned arguments in favor of revising the 
defamation analysis do not comport with the Court’s rationale in 
New York Times and its progeny. Additionally, they are 
unnecessary revisions that over-complicate an already confusing 
area of law. Trial courts will be better served to continue to apply 
traditional defamation law, regardless of the publication medium.  
IV. @COURTS: IF IT AIN’T BROKE, DON’T FIX IT  
The rise in Twitter’s popularity has triggered a 
contemporaneous growth in twibel lawsuits.211 This Part will 
demonstrate that the standards set forth in the Court’s defamation 
jurisprudence remain workable, despite recent changes in 
technology. This Part first explains how the Gertz public–private 
figure distinction212 can be approached in twibel claims. Second, 
this Part explores Twitter’s impact on the Dun & Bradstreet 
subject matter considerations.213 Finally, this Part discusses the 
importance of considering tweets in the context214 of 
contemporaneously published tweets for the purpose of identifying 
                                                                                                             
 210. The Supreme Court of Western Australia commented on the emerging 
distinction between traditional and electronic media, noting the possibility that a 
user might post a message online without the proper consideration: 
Emails, SMS messaging, Twitter, blogs and other forms of social 
media such as Facebook impact on the way people communicate and 
the language they use. Communications through those media often lack 
the formality and careful consideration that was once thought to mark 
the difference between the written and spoken word. The very purpose 
of the media is to enable people to communicate instantaneously, often 
in a language that is blunt in its message and attenuated in its form. 
That will affect both what is regarded as defamatory and the potential 
for harm. 
Prefumo v. Bradley [2011] WASC 251, ¶ 43 (Austl.). 
 211. See supra Introduction. 
 212. See supra Part I.C.1.c. 
 213. See supra Part I.D.1. 
 214. See supra text accompanying note 32. 
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matters of public concern and distinguishing false factual 
statements from statements of pure opinion.  
A. @Courts: The Gertz @Public–PrivateFigure Distinction 
Remains Relevant 
In Gertz, the Court noted the characteristics of public figures 
that justify the distinction between public and private figures in 
defamation lawsuits.215 The “all-purpose” public figure “may 
achieve such pervasive fame or notoriety that he becomes a public 
figure for all purposes and in all contexts.”216 The “limited-
purpose” public figure, on the other hand, “injects himself or is 
drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a 
public figure for a limited range of issues.”217 The critical feature 
of public figures, according to the Court, is that they “assume 
special prominence in the resolution of public questions.”218  
As discussed above, lower courts have expounded the Gertz 
criteria to establish a test for distinguishing between public and 
private figures.219 A straightforward application of tests like the 
Waldbaum analysis220 will yield accurate results, even in the 
context of modern twibel claims.  
For example, lower courts have required an individual to 
essentially achieve “celebrity” status to be considered an “all-
purpose” public figure.221 This inquiry is readily applicable to 
twibel plaintiffs. One does not gain or lose celebrity status simply 
by being discussed on Twitter. If the plaintiff in a traditional 
defamation case222 would be considered an “all-purpose” public 
figure, he should be considered an “all-purpose” public figure as 
the plaintiff in a twibel claim. For instance, if the roles were 
                                                                                                             
 215. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344–45 (1974). 
 216. Id. at 351.  
 217. Id.  
 218. Id. Basing the public–private figure distinction on the individual’s 
“special prominence in the resolution of public questions” seems to require 
courts to first decide whether the issues underlying the individual’s alleged 
“public figure status” indeed constitute a public question, thereby forcing courts 
to examine the public nature of two separate issues in the process of determining 
whether “actual malice” applies. 
 219. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 220. See supra Part I.C.2. The Waldbaum Court set forth useful tests for 
identifying both “all-purpose” public figures and “limited-purpose” public 
figures.  
 221. See, e.g., Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1294 
(D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 222. This section uses the term traditional defamation case to refer to a 
defamation case involving traditional media, such as a newspaper or the radio.  
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reversed223 in Simorangkir v. Love,224 Ms. Love would likely be an 
“all-purpose” public figure225 and be required to prove that 
Simorangkir acted with “actual malice” in order to recover 
damages. Conversely, if the plaintiff in a traditional defamation 
action has not achieved the pervasive notoriety required for “all-
purpose” public figure status, he should not be labeled as such just 
because the defamatory statement was published on Twitter.226  
The “limited-purpose” public figure analysis should be applied 
in a similar fashion. The test set forth in Waldbaum requires courts 
to consider three factors when defining the plaintiff’s public or 
private figure status: (1) whether there is a public controversy; (2) 
whether the plaintiff thrusts himself to the forefront of the public 
controversy; and (3) whether the defamation directly addresses the 
plaintiff’s role in the public controversy.227 To extend this test to 
twibel claims, courts need only take special care in defining the 
scope and origin of the public controversy. One of two possible 
scenarios will emerge once the controversy is defined.  
First, the public controversy may have originated on Twitter.228 
In this case, the court should consider the number of times the 
plaintiff tweeted in an effort to help resolve the issue and the extent 
to which the plaintiff addressed the issue through other mediums. 
For Twitter-specific controversies, evidence will be readily 
available (because public tweets are immortalized in the Library of 
Congress229) to provide concrete examples of the plaintiff’s 
voluntary immersion in the resolution of the controversy. If the 
plaintiff has only tangentially involved himself in the dispute, he 
                                                                                                             
 223. That is, if Love sued Simrangkir for a defamatory tweet.  
 224. See supra text accompanying notes 4–15.  
 225. Love’s infamous status as the “most controversial woman in the history 
of rock,” in addition to her highly publicized marriage to the late Kurt Cobain is 
likely sufficient to classify her as an “all-purpose” public figure. See Chris 
Harris, Courtney Love Loses Temporary Legal Control of Frances Bean, 
ROLLING STONE, Dec. 14, 2009, http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news 
/courtney-love-loses-temporary-legal-control-of-frances-bean-20091214. 
 226. For instance, Dr. Darm likely has not achieved sufficient “fame” or 
“notoriety” to be considered an “all-purpose” public figure by virtue of his 
profession alone in his twibel action against Tiffany Craig. See supra text 
accompanying notes 19–23.  
 227. See Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1296 (D.C. 
Cir. 1980); see also supra Part I.C.2.b.  
 228. Twitter-specific public controversies will likely be rare, but the scenario 
might emerge if a certain topic gained sufficient coverage as a “trending topic.” 
See About Trending Topics, supra note 32. The possibility remains that enough 
Twitter users might debate a public issue on Twitter enough to establish a 
“controversy” even though the issue has not arisen to the level of a 
“controversy” in the traditional media.  
 229. See Reymond, supra note 209.  
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should not be classified as a “limited-purpose” public figure, and 
the state-defined level of fault is applicable.230  
The second and more likely scenario that might arise when 
courts define the origin of the public controversy is that the dispute 
originated outside the realm of Twitter. In this case, the analysis 
should proceed in the same manner that it would if the defamatory 
statement were published in a different form. The defamer’s choice 
of medium is irrelevant for the issue of defining the plaintiff’s 
public or private status.  
Essentially, courts should distinguish public figures (whether 
“all-purpose” or “limited-purpose”) from private figures in twibel 
claims in the same manner that courts make this distinction in a 
traditional defamation claim. The fact that the defamatory 
statement was posted on Twitter does not change the extent of the 
plaintiff’s involvement in the resolution of a public controversy. 
As such, there appears to be no barrier to applying the Waldbaum 
analysis, or similar tests, for the purpose of distinguishing between 
public and private figure twibel plaintiffs. The ease with which 
these analyses transfer to twibel claims is mirrored in other areas 
of defamation law, including the public–private subject matter 
considerations.  
B. Hashtag Relevance: Defining #MattersOfPublicConcern 
The public or private nature of a twibelous statement can be 
readily discerned by logically analyzing the subject matter of the 
statement. Again, two scenarios are possible where the statement 
relates to a “matter of public concern.”231 First, the statement may 
clearly concern a matter of broad public interest, such as a 
presidential election. In this case, the fact that the claim arose from 
a tweet is irrelevant, and the claim should be analyzed in the same 
way as a defamation claim arising from a traditional publication.  
The second scenario might arise when the defamatory tweet 
concerns an important issue, not to the public as a whole, but to a 
specific online community.232 To gauge the public’s interest in the 
                                                                                                             
 230. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).  
 231. There is, of course, a third scenario that would arise when the tweet 
bears no relation to a matter of public concern.  
 232. This scenario is possible when the twibel plaintiff has voluntarily thrust 
himself or herself to the forefront of a “trending topic.” See supra text 
accompanying note 32. Additionally, this scenario could arise when the tweet 
centers on a specific issue that is of great importance for a specific group of 
people. For example, tweets that focus on defamation on Twitter may be 
important to First Amendment scholars who are trying to determine how the 
issue will be resolved.  
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subject matter, courts may use “Twitter Search”233 or “Advanced 
Twitter Search”234 to determine the frequency with which users are 
discussing an issue on Twitter. Furthermore, users’ inclusion of the 
hashtag should aid courts in deciding whether the defamatory 
statement relates to an issue about which other users have voiced 
concern. If a “Twitter Search” reveals tweets containing a hashtag 
relevant to the defamatory tweet at issue, a court may click on the 
hashtag to reveal other tweets on the same topic.235 
“Hashtag tracking” may be used as an additional means to 
consider the public nature of the allegedly defamatory tweet’s 
subject matter. Frequently used hashtags are tracked as “trending 
topics.”236 Although treating oft-tweeted topics as matters of public 
concern may broaden the category of speech included in “matters 
of public concern,”237 considering “trending topics” will allow 
courts to appreciate modern concerns that are appealing to a larger 
community instead of limiting the inquiry to traditional topics.  
One might argue that the 140-character limit for tweets may 
limit a court’s ability to discern the specific subject matter of the 
defamatory statement in some cases.238 When a tweet appears to 
contain an incomplete thought, courts should look to see whether 
the tweet was posted by itself or contemporaneously with 
subsequent tweets that clarify the author’s message. If the 
defamatory tweet is published alone without at least partially 
implicating a public issue, the tweet should be characterized as one 
relating to a matter of purely private concern. If, however, the 
tweet is posted contemporaneously with other tweets, the court 
                                                                                                             
 233. Users may use the “search” feature on Twitter to search for tweets about a 
certain topic. How to Search on Twitter, TWITTER, https://support.twitter 
.com/groups/31-twitter-basics/topics/110-search/articles/132700-how-to-search-on-
twitter (last visited Jan. 2, 2013). 
 234. The “advanced search” feature can be used to fine tune search results if 
the basic search feature did not reveal the desired results. How to Use Advanced 
Twitter Search, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/groups/31-twitter-basics 
/topics/110-search/articles/71577-how-to-use-advanced-twitter-search (last visited 
Nov. 6, 2011).  
 235. See What Are Hashtags (“#” Symbols)?, supra note 159 (“Clicking on a 
hashtagged word in any message shows you all other Tweets marked with that 
keyword.”). 
 236. FAQs About Twitter’s Trends, supra note 32. 
 237. By including topics that would not traditionally be considered public 
questions. 
 238. The 140-character limit on Tweets may limit the user’s ability to publish 
his or her entire message in a single tweet. Tweets reflecting incomplete 
thoughts might be misconstrued if not properly analyzed in the context of 
contemporaneously published tweets. See infra Part IV.C. 
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must engage in a context analysis to determine whether the overall 
thrust of the message addresses a matter of public concern.239 
C. Referring to Contemporaneously Published Tweets for 
#ContextAnalysis  
1. Using Concurrent Tweets to Identify 
#MattersOfPublicConcern 
At times, a tweet’s relevance to a matter of public concern may 
be difficult to determine due to the 140-character limitation. In these 
cases, courts must examine the “content, form, and context” of the 
twibelous statement.240 Presently, it is unclear whether the context 
of a single tweet includes tweets published contemporaneously by 
the defendant for the purposes of determining whether a tweet 
relates to a matter of public concern.241 This Comment argues that 
courts should consider the user’s related tweets in determining 
whether the allegedly libelous tweet addresses a matter of public 
concern.242  
The scope of the appropriate “context analysis” will be defined 
more easily, and the end result will be more just, if courts adopt a 
simplified approach for determining the context of a libelous tweet. 
Due to the 140-character limitation and the resulting limitation on 
the amount of information that can be included in a tweet,243 
                                                                                                             
 239. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc, 472 U.S. 749, 
761 (1985) (“Whether . . . speech addresses a matter of public concern must be 
determined by [the expression’s] content, form, and context . . . .” (emphasis 
added) (quoting Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983))); see also 
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1217 (2011) (holding that when the “overall 
thrust” of the communication relates to a matter of public concern, the 
communication should be protected).  
 240. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 762 (1985) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983)).  
 241. Lyrissa Lidsky, A Libel Proof Defendant? Courtney Love’s Twitter 
Defamation, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 5, 2011, 6:27 PM), http://prawfsblawg 
.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/02/a-libel-proof-defendant-courtney-loves-
twitter-defamation.html.  
 242. This approach is comparable to the Court’s analysis in Snyder, 131 S. 
Ct. at 1217. There, the Court considered all of the protest signs together to 
conclude that the “overall thrust and dominant theme of Westboro’s 
demonstration spoke to broader public issues.” Id. 
 243. Furthermore, the user forfeits additional characters if the tweeter inserts a 
hashtag. See How to Post Links (URLs) in Tweets, TWITTER, https://support 
.twitter.com/groups/31-twitter-basics/topics/109-tweets-messages/articles/78124–
how-to-post-links-urls (last visited Dec. 18, 2012) (noting that links posted in 
tweets may be shortened to 20 characters but still detract from the 140-character 
allotment). The inclusion of links in the 140-character limit supports the 
594 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 
 
 
 
fairness dictates that contemporaneously published tweets should 
be considered in determining whether the tweet at issue relates to a 
matter of public concern. Twitter is a valuable medium for 
discussing important issues, but if tweets are singled out and 
examined in a vacuum, users may be less likely to discuss 
important issues for fear of being punished for a statement that is 
subject to multiple interpretations when taken out of context. The 
possible self-censorship that might result from this form of 
interpretation is contrary to the policies underlying the First 
Amendment.244  
At first glance, this issue appears to be straightforward. Why 
wouldn’t courts look to the lines directly above and below the 
tweet in question to determine a tweet’s relevance to matters of 
public concern? The complication emerges when the tweet is 
considered from the perspective of the tweeter’s audience. When a 
user signs in to his Twitter account, he is presented with his 
“timeline,” which publishes all of the tweets published by any user 
that he follows on Twitter. The tweets appear in real time rather 
than appearing in an order prescribed by the user.245 Therefore, a 
tweeter that follows a large number of people may receive a large 
number of tweets at one time. This has the effect of possibly 
creating a large separation between a single user’s tweets 
published only minutes apart.246  
The problems with a “context analysis” that considers 
contemporaneously published tweets alongside the allegedly 
defamatory tweet for purposes of defining the tweet’s relevance to 
a matter of public importance do not outweigh the First 
Amendment ramifications of analyzing single tweets under a 
microscope. Ultimately, refusing to consider tweets that may 
clarify the author’s message will chill speech because users will be 
less likely to discuss important public issues on Twitter if, in so 
                                                                                                             
 
proposition that contemporaneously published tweets should be considered with 
the allegedly defamatory tweet because, although links reduce the number of 
characters a user may dedicate to his personal message, they may help link the 
statement to a public issue. Inserting an @mention does not detract from the 140-
character limit. See About Tweets (Twitter Updates), supra note 148.  
 244. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) (“The 
rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate . . . . It is 
inconsistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”). 
 245. See What Is a Twitter Timeline?, supra note 142.  
 246. For instance, User A may post a tweet which appears on one of his 
follower’s, User B’s, timeline. While User A is formulating a related tweet, User 
B may receive tweets from Users C, D, and E. Therefore, when User A posts the 
second tweet, it will be separated from his first tweet on User B’s timeline by the 
three tweets from other users.  
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doing, they run the risk of being subjected to a large damage award 
for libel. Moreover, the ambiguity that might arise if intervening 
tweets separate related messages from a single user may be 
resolved if the audience investigates the twibelous statement 
further by clicking on the tweet. When a user clicks on the name of 
the user who posted the original tweet, a pop-up window appears 
above the user’s timeline, providing additional information related 
to that message.247 Thus, clicking on a user’s name above his or 
her tweet will immediately place the defamatory tweet in the 
context of other tweets that were published around the same time. 
Moreover, clicking on the user’s name in the pop-up window will 
redirect the viewer to the tweeter’s full profile, thereby revealing 
all of the user’s tweets. Therefore, a proper “context analysis” will 
consider contemporaneously published tweets to ensure that the 
court views the twibelous statement in the same context as a user 
viewing the tweet.248 This sort of analysis should provide the court 
with sufficient information to determine the tweet’s relevance to 
important public issues and reduce the danger of mischaracterizing 
the tweet.  
2. Using Concurrent Tweets to Identify #StatementsOfFact 
The “context analysis” described above should also be applied 
to distinguish statements of fact from statements conveying the 
author’s opinion. For an expression to form the basis of a 
defamation lawsuit, it must include a false statement of fact.249 
Statements amounting to nothing more than “rhetorical hyperbole” 
or “epithets” are not considered to be defamatory.250  
                                                                                                             
 247. See What Is a Twitter Timeline?, supra note 142. The added information 
includes the tweeting user’s most recent tweets. 
 248. When considering a user’s tweets as a whole for the purpose of 
establishing the public nature of the tweet’s subject matter, courts should 
consider the length of time between the various tweets. Because a user’s 
timeline is updated in real time as tweets are posted, tweets posted within a short 
period of time will likely appear in close proximity to each other on the timeline 
of the users following the tweeter. While there is a possibility that a small lapse 
of several minutes would allow other users’ tweets to interrupt the string of 
thought from a single user, the probability increases significantly with a longer 
lapse in time. Therefore, delayed publication of subsequent tweets that clarify 
the user’s message should be valued less than tweets published only moments 
later. 
 249. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1990). 
 250. Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13–14 
(1970).  
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The Court’s decision in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal 
Company251 highlights the importance of considering twibelous 
statements in the context of contemporaneously published tweets 
for this purpose. The petitioner in Milkovich was a high school 
wrestling coach who sued a local newspaper for defamation, 
alleging that an article it published accused him of perjury.252 The 
Court granted certiorari to consider whether statements of opinion 
are privileged under the First Amendment in defamation cases.253 
Specifically, the Court discussed whether a piece of dicta from 
Gertz supported an opinion exemption:  
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false 
idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend 
for its correctness not on the conscience of judges and 
juries, but on the competition of other ideas. But there is no 
constitutional value in false statements of fact.254  
The Court rejected the newspaper’s argument that, under this 
passage from Gertz, statements of opinion are absolutely protected 
in defamation actions.255 Rather, the Court held that “the 
‘breathing space’ which ‘[f]reedoms of expression require in order 
to survive’ is adequately secured by existing constitutional 
doctrine256 without the creation of an artificial dichotomy between 
‘opinion’ and fact.”257 Furthermore, statements of opinion can also 
                                                                                                             
 251. 497 U.S. 1. 
 252. Id. at 6. The article’s headline and nine statements in the body of the 
article implied that Petitioner lied under oath during a judicial proceeding 
regarding an incident involving Petitioner and his wrestling team at a wrestling 
match. Id. at 3.  
 253. Id. at 10. 
 254. Id. at 18 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 
(1974)). 
 255. Id. at 18. 
 256. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986) (requiring 
the plaintiff in a defamation action to prove falsity as well as fault); Greenbelt 
Coop. Publ’g Ass’n, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13–14 (1970) (finding that the 
word blackmail was not defamatory under the circumstances because “even the 
most careless reader must have perceived the word was no more than rhetorical 
hyperbole, a vigorous epithet”); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 
50 (1988) (holding that the First Amendment protects ad parody focused on a 
public-figure plaintiff which “could not reasonably have been interpreted as 
stating actual facts about the public figures involved”); Letter Carriers v. Austin, 
418 U.S. 264, 284–86 (1974). (The word traitor was not defamatory under the 
circumstances because it was used “in a loose, figurative sense” and was 
“merely rhetorical hyperbole, a lusty and imaginative expression of the 
contempt felt by union members.”). 
 257. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19 (citations omitted). 
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imply a false statement of fact.258 Thus, the essential question for 
determining whether a statement is actionable is whether a 
reasonable reader would conclude that the communication implies 
a factual assertion about the plaintiff.259 The Milkovich Court 
found that the headline and nine statements in the article, read 
together, implied that Petitioner perjured himself at the judicial 
proceeding.260 If the statements were found to be factually false,261 
Petitioner would be permitted to recover upon a showing that the 
newspaper acted with the requisite level of fault.262 
Just as the statements in the Milkovich publication were 
considered together, tweets published together must be read in the 
context of one another to determine whether a “reasonable 
factfinder”263 would conclude that the tweet conveys a provably 
                                                                                                             
 258. Id. at 18. Although the Milkovich Court held that opinion is not per se 
protected by the Constitution, oftentimes opinion can neither be proved true nor 
false. Because a plaintiff must prove falsity to prevail, opinion remains protected 
as a matter of constitutional law in many cases. See SACK, supra note 36, § 
4.2.4.2, at 4-15 (citing Andrews v. Stalling, 892 P.2d 611 (N.M. Ct. App. 
1995)).  
 259. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21 (“The dispositive question in the present 
case then becomes whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the 
statements in the Diadiun column imply an assertion that petitioner Milkovich 
perjured himself . . . . ”). 
 260. Id.  
 261. The Court reasoned that a perjury action would be able to determine 
whether or not Petitioner did, in fact, perjure himself. Id. Once transcripts and 
witnesses were presented, the lower court would be in a position to determine 
whether the statements in the article were actually “false statements of fact.” Id. 
 262. Petitioner would either be required to prove the newspaper acted with 
“actual malice” or with the state supplied level of fault per Gertz. The Court did 
not discuss whether Petitioner was to be classified as a public figure, but the 
Ohio Supreme Court noted in dicta that Petitioner was likely to be considered a 
public figure. See Scott v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699, 704 (Ohio 1986) (“To 
say that Milkovich nevertheless was not a public figure for purposes of 
discussion about the controversy is simply nonsense.” (quoting Lorain Journal 
Co. v. Milkovich, 474 U.S. 953, 964 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting))). 
 263. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21. See also Mashburn v. Collin, 355 So. 2d 879, 
885 (La. 1977) (“Words which, taken by themselves, would appear to be a 
positive allegation of fact, may be shown by the context to be a mere expression 
of opinion or argumentative influence.”); Gray v. St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 221 
F.3d 243, 248–49 (1st Cir. 2000) (“Whether calling something a ‘fake’ is or is 
not protected opinion depends very much on what is meant and therefore on 
context.”). Moreover, as the New York Court of Appeals stated: 
To illustrate, if the statement “John is a thief” is actionable when 
considered in its applicable context, the statement “I believe John is a 
thief” would be equally actionable when placed in precisely the same 
context. By the same token, however, the assertion that “John is a thief” 
could well be treated as an expression of opinion or rhetorical 
hyperbole when it is accompanied by other statements, such as “John 
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false statement of fact.264 The 140-character limitation might limit 
the reasonable interpretation inquiry in the same way that it may 
hinder courts trying to identify a tweet’s relevance to a matter of 
public concern.265 An author may not be able to provide sufficient 
information in 140 characters to fully explicate his position. 
Therefore, a court must look beyond the tweet at issue to fully 
grasp the author’s message.266 
Julie Hilden offered a different approach for distinguishing 
statements of fact from statements of pure opinion. Hilden noted 
that tweeters should develop a way to verify that a tweet reflects 
the author’s opinion and does not reflect a statement of fact, such 
as using the abbreviation “IMHO” (“in my humble opinion”).267 
Although the solution seems simple enough, inserting an opinion 
disclaimer is likely insufficient by itself to grant the statement 
constitutional protection alone. As the Court stated in Milkovich, 
“[s]imply couching such statements in terms of opinion does not 
dispel these implications; and the statement, ‘In my opinion Jones 
is a liar,’ can cause as much damage to reputation as the statement, 
‘Jones is a liar.’”268 Or as Judge Friendly noted: “[It] would be 
destructive of the law of libel if a writer could escape liability for 
accusations of [defamatory conduct] simply by using, explicitly or 
implicitly, the words ‘I think.’”269  
In Finkel v. Dauber,270 an Internet user filed a defamation suit 
against several adolescent Facebook271 users, alleging that posts 
                                                                                                             
 
stole my heart,” that, taken in context, convey to the reasonable reader 
that something other than an objective fact is being asserted. 
Gross v. New York Times Co., 623 N.E.2d 1163, 1169 (N.Y. 1993).  
 264. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21. 
 265. See supra Part IV.B. 
 266. As the New Jersey Supreme Court stated in Leers v. Green: 
The distinction between an allegation of fact and expression of opinion 
. . . often depends on what is stated in the rest of the [communication]. 
If the defendant accurately states what some public man has really 
done, and then asserts that ‘such conduct is disgraceful,’ this is merely 
[a nonactionable] expression of his opinion, his comments on the 
plaintiff’s conduct. 
131 A.2d 781, 787 (N.J. 1957) (quoting ODGERS, LIBEL AND SLANDER 166 (6th 
ed. 1929)). This statement remains relevant post-Milkovich. See SACK, supra 
note 36, § 4.3.1, at 4-30.  
 267. Hilden, supra note 164.  
 268. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19. 
 269. Cianci v. New Times Publ’g Co., 639 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir. 1980).  
 270. 906 N.Y.S.2d 697 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010). 
 271. Facebook is a social media website dedicated to giving “people the 
power to share and make the world more open and connected.” Facebook—
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made to a “secret group”272 damaged her reputation.273 The posts 
included statements that the plaintiff was seen having sexual 
relations with a horse, contracted HIV from sharing needles with 
heroin addicts, contracted AIDS from a male prostitute, and 
transformed into the devil.274 The defendants moved for partial 
summary judgment on the issue of liability.275 The trial court 
granted the defendants’ motion, noting: 
A reasonable reader, given the context of the posts, simply 
would not believe that the Plaintiff contracted AIDS by 
having sex with a horse or a baboon or that she contracted 
AIDS from a male prostitute who also gave her crabs and 
syphilis, or that having contracted sexually transmitted 
diseases in such a manner she morphed into the devil. 
Taken together, the statements can only be read as puerile 
attempts by adolescents to outdo each other.276 
Rather than scrutinize each comment posted to the Facebook 
group individually, the court analyzed the posts in the context of 
one another.277  
The Finkel decision demonstrates the importance of fully 
analyzing the context of defamatory tweets. If the Finkel Court 
analyzed each post separately, the statements might reasonably be 
interpreted as stating actual facts about the plaintiff. But when 
analyzed together, the Facebook posts were properly considered to 
be nonactionable rhetorical hyperbole.278 By following the Finkel 
Court’s approach, courts will mitigate the challenges imposed by 
Twitter’s 140-character limitation and ensure that tweets 
                                                                                                             
 
About, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/facebook?sk=info (last visited 
Dec. 18, 2012).  
 272. The statements posted to the secret group were not visible to anyone 
other than the six members of the group. Finkel, 906 N.Y.S.2d at 700. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. at 700. 
 275. Id.  
 276. Id. at 702. 
 277. See id. (quoting Guerrero v. Carva, 779 N.Y.S.2d 12, 18 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2004)) (“[T]he courts should look to the over-all context in which the 
assertions were made and determine on that basis whether the reasonable reader 
would have believed that the challenged statements were conveying facts about 
the libel plaintiff.”). 
 278. See Finkel, 906 N.Y.S.2d at 702. The Finkel Court did not actually label 
the statements as “rhetorical hyperbole” but chalked the posts up to be a “vulgar 
attempt at humor.” Id. The critical point in the decision is that, considered 
together, the posts would not be interpreted by a reasonable reader to convey 
provably false statements of fact. Id.  
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surmounting to no more than “rhetorical hyperbole” or “vigorous 
epithets” are not misconstrued as asserting actionable false 
statements of fact.  
As this Comment has argued, traditional defamation law 
remains applicable decades after New York Times was decided. 
Twibel claims, an unheard-of form of defamation at the time the 
Court began interpreting the First Amendment implications of state 
defamation law, may be analyzed under the traditional defamation 
framework originally applied to defamatory statements in 
newspapers and radio broadcasting.  
CONCLUSION 
In many regards, Twitter has revolutionized modern 
communication. Hundreds of thousands of people log in to Twitter 
every day to read the news, share interesting stories, and connect 
with their peers. For the first time in history, the average citizen 
has the ability to participate in the same forum as celebrities, 
politicians, major news networks, and famous athletes. The 
transformation in electronic media will soon force a court to 
answer one question: Must the law adapt to give leeway to the 
inexperienced citizen-publisher, or must tweeters279 remain 
mindful of the carefully crafted compromise between the core 
values implicit in the First Amendment and society’s interest in 
redressing the injury caused by fictitious attacks on reputation set 
forth in the string of case law following New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan? This Comment argues that the latter is the appropriate 
approach. Rather than engage in a superfluous discussion of legal 
theory, this Comment has set forth a realistic, step-by-step 
approach that will guide a trial court in applying the traditional 
defamation framework to the modern twibel claim.  
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 279. And others who employ the new forms of electronic communication. 
 ∗ J.D./D.C.L., 2012, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University. 
The author would like to thank Professor Christine Corcos for her guidance, advice, 
and insightful ideas. Thanks are also due to friends and family who supported me 
throughout the writing process. Lastly, I appreciate the hard work of the members of 
the Louisiana Law Review in the production of this Comment. All errors are my 
own. 
